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AGRICULTURE IN THE URUGUAY ROUND:
A UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE*
Jimmye S. Hillmant
"The only new thing in the world is the history we do not know."
Harry Truman
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two centuries the United States has suffered from isola-
tionism, protectionism and lack of leadership in creating and maintaining
consistent agricultural and trade policies. From the country's beginning,
an export market was taken for granted as the natural order of things,
and national trade policy consisted essentially of arguments over tariffs
and customs duties. After more than a century of this, World War I
should have awakened the United States to its potential for a new role in
world affairs. Its answer was a rejection of the League of Nations in the
early 1920s, followed by reinforced protectionism throughout that dec-
ade, and by the disastrous Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1929. Failed pro-
tectionist attempts to "make the tariff effective for agriculture" centred
on five McNary-Haugen Bills (1924-28), which included a two-price sys-
tem. As an added negative effect on world trade, the United States for
some years after World War I ignored its new role as the world's chief
creditor.
* Reprinted with the permission of the author and MacMillan Publishers.
t Professor Emeritus, Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics, University of
Arizona.
This article appears as chapter 3 of KENNETH A. INGERSENT ET AL., AGRICULTURE AND THE
URUGUAY ROUND (1992). My thanks to the editors and to MacMillan for their permission to
publish it here. The acknowlegment should be made. This chapter was written principally while I
was a Visiting Professor at Lincoln University, New Zealand. Special thanks are due to Jan Clark
and Elnora Fairbank for their assistance with the manuscript. Since the end of the Tokyo Round, I
have observed an increasing volume of quantitative econometric analysis with respect to agricultural
trade in general and the Uruguay Round in particular. Thus far, the effect of this analysis in helping
to resolve the fundamental concerns dividing the United States, Europe, Japan, and the Cairns group
on farm and trade issues has been unclear. Hence, I approached the United States' perspective of the
Uruguay Round from a politico-economic position.
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In an attempt to reverse isolationism and failed trade policies, the
U.S. Congress enacted the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTA) of
June 1934 in which was incorporated the unique idea of Reciprocal
Trade Agreements, an idea which has endured for more than 50 years of
trade negotiations. The essence of that Act (initially enacted for a period
of three years) empowered the President to order tariff cuts of up to 50%
on a bi-lateral, reciprocal basis, and that such cuts would be extended to
third countries on a most favored nation (MFN) basis, provided that
they were prepared to reciprocate by giving equally favourable treatment
to imports from the United States. The fact that farmers, who had been
particularly hurt by the shrinkage of their exports and the price slump
accompanying it, needed larger foreign markets to improve their situa-
tion was recognized in the reference in the Act's introductory paragraph
to trade expansion "as a means of... establishing.., a better relation-
ship among various branches of American agriculture, industry, mining,
and commerce."
The RTA was pushed through Congress, and the President was
given this unprecedented authority, despite all the illiberal domestic pol-
icy (including farm programs) which was being enacted at the same time.
Die-hard protectionists in the farm sector who still favoured the high
Hawley-Smoot tariffs and export dumping as principal agricultural pol-
icy tools lost the battle early with Henry A. Wallace, President Franklin
Roosevelt's Secretary of Agriculture, who favoured the expansion of
markets through tariff modification.
Protectionists had not lost the war, however. Perhaps they consid-
ered the RTA an aberration which posed no real threat to their long term
position. Also, RTA in one sense was a trade-off for the path-breaking
elements of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933. Section
22, a part of the AAA, as amended in 1934, and the RTA were legislated
more or less simultaneously, emphasising the political insight as well as
the power of President Roosevelt. Section 22 was designed to protect the
economic viability of domestic farm price supports.
The essence of Section 22 is that it legalized agricultural impact quo-
tas subject to certain constraints; that is, agricultural import quotas are
legal provided a government support programme is in force covering the
"like domestic product."' That is still the case. Section 22 authorizes
the President of the United States to restrict the importation of commod-
ities by the imposition of fees or quotas if such importation would render
1. For a detailed discussion and update of Section 22 legislation and activities, see, JiMMyE S.
HILLMAN, TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO AGRICULTURAL TRADE 19, 98-99, app. c (1991).
[Vol. 28:761
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ineffective or materially interfere with the policies of the Department of
Agriculture in relation to agricultural commodities. The scope and per-
missible action of the original legislation were expanded by the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1951, under which no trade agreement or
other international agreement can be applied in a manner inconsistent
with requirements found in Section 22. The Trade Expansion Act of
1962 also makes that exception. It will be shown later that the United
States, as part of its negotiating position in the Uruguay Round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations, expressed a willingness to negotiate the repeal
of Section 22, but certain domestic farm interests continued to vigorously
resist this change. If this piece of fundamental legislation were elimi-
nated, and if no comparable substitute were put in place, the United
States would, indeed, have taken a major step in removing the principal
bulwark of its agricultural protection.
An additional disposition toward protection and trade distortion
was continued in Section 32 of the 1933 AAA. Section 32 authorized the
use of import duty revenues to subsidize the disposal of surpluses, domes-
tically and abroad. Further, there was constant agitation in some agri-
cultural quarters to legislate a marketing scheme with a discriminatory
two-price system for farm products, domestic and foreign. Thus began a
period of about 40 years (1933-73) of predominantly inward-looking,
protectionistic agricultural policies, which became increasingly at odds
with the United States position in the Post-World-War II ambience and
with the country's position in the post-war trade negotiations.
Rather than exercise a bold and liberal posture from its overwhelm-
ing economic status in the early 1950s, United States permitted the pro-
tectionistic views of farmers and farm organisations to prevail in the
negotiation of waivers and exceptions to GATT Article XI on the gen-
eral elimination of quantitative restrictions. Adding to this and other
protective devices was the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480), the principal aspect of which was an
expanded surplus disposal programme, some of it through export subsi-
dies. Again a strong overall economic and political position of the
United States was undermined and dissipated by rather narrow, vested
interest groups.
Since World War II there have been eight GATT rounds of trade
negotiations (Geneva 1947; Annecy 1949; Torquay 1951; Geneva 1956;
Dillon 1960-61; Kennedy 1964-67; Tokyo 1974-79; Uruguay 1986-90),
most of which were devoted to reduction of tariffs on manufactured
products. The Uruguay Round was the first to focus primarily on the
1993]
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agricultural sector and again the United States, which was the leader in
insisting on that focus, found itself in the years immediately prior to 1986
in a position of qualified ambivalence with respect to its agricultural and
trade policies. Even though the United States was, and still is, less culpa-
ble than its major trading partners, Japan and the European Community,
it began the Uruguay Round with agricultural policies which resulted in
total transfers to producers from taxpayers and consumers, less budget
revenues (direct costs) of $88 billion (U.S.) in 1986, and which total was
still $67 billion (U.S.) in 1989 (Table 3.1). The data in Table 3.1 demon-
strate both the continuing enormity of the problems of agricultural pol-
icy distortion and the urgency of finding solutions for fundamental
resource adjustment in the agricultural sectors of the world economy.
This data emphasises that, amongst OECD countries, the lion's share of
income transfers to farmers induced by agricultural policy are attributa-
ble to the European Community (12), the United States, and Japan, in
that order.
II. UNITED STATES URUGUAY ROUND OBJECTIVES
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, like most important
historical events and phenomena, had factors underlying or leading up to
it which are of vital importance for our understanding and objective anal-
ysis. As already suggested in the introduction, the United States has had
a long-standing, ambivalent position with respect to agricultural protec-
tion and international trade policy. The roots of conflict lie deep in the
evolution of U.S. economic development and occasionally manifest them-
selves negatively, as was the case with the 1947-48 negotiations over
whether to include an International Trade Organisation (ITO) in the Ha-
vana Charter. United States interests and farm organisations led the op-
position to the creation of an ITO.
Article XI, Section 1 of the GATT states:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
But, due to the widespread incidence of agricultural protectionist
sentiment around the world, including in the United States, an exception
to this general ban on the use of non-tariff barriers to trade was made in
the case of agriculture. Thus, paragraph 2 was added to Article XI in
[Vol. 28:761
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order to make an exception in the case of agriculture to the otherwise
general ban on the use of non-tariff barriers to trade. Sub-paragraph
2(c)(i) of Article XI effectively legalises an agricultural import quota,
provided a supply control programme is in force restricting the produc-
tion of the "like domestic product." However, the United States was not
happy with sub-paragraph 2(c)(i) because the constraint it imposed on
the use of an agricultural import quota was tighter than the constraint
imposed by Section 22 of the 1934 amendment of the AAA. Whereas
Section 22 authorises the quantitative restriction of imports, subject only
to a government support programme being in force for the "like domestic
commodity," Article XI.2(c)(i) of the GATT stipulates that the govern-
ment programme must include supply control. Dissatisfaction with Arti-
cle XI.2(c)(i) eventually led to the United States being granted a waiver
of its commitments under those provisions. The celebrated Section 22
waiver was granted to the United States in 1955, as part of a wider revi-
sion of the General Agreement effected in that year. Although, in the
strict letter of the law, the 1955 waiver applied only to the United States,
after it had been granted other GATT signatories understandably felt
free to impose quantitative restrictions on imports of agricultural prod-
ucts without domestic supply control. By taking this action when it was
at a comparative advantage and in a dominant position in world agricul-
ture and trade, the United States sacrificed the high ground of interna-
tional agricultural trade policy in round after round of GATT trade
negotiations for the next 30 years.2
These rounds of GATT negotiations since World War II resulted in
significant reductions in industrial tariffs but not in agricultural protec-
tion. Instead, new methods of restricting agriculture arose, especially of
the non-tariff type. The United States after a 40-year, inward-looking
policy discovered it no longer dominated world agricultural commodity
markets. After a respite of trade prosperity in the mid-1970s, the in-
creased market competition, lower farm prices, and rural depression all
succeeded in focusing American attention on foreign markets as a possi-
ble solution to farm distress. Unfortunately, a period of high exchange
rates for the American dollar meant that its over-valuation would spell
disaster for agricultural exports. In calendar year, 1981 U.S. agricultural
exports had reached almost $44 billion, or 30% of gross sales. From this
peak exports dropped to $26 billion in 1986, or only 19% of gross farm
2. JANE M. PORTER & DOUGLAS E. BOWERS, USDA STAFF REPORT AGES 89, A SHORT
HISTORY OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1989).
1993]
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sales, and payments to U.S. producers for farm price and income sup-
ports had skyrocketed to almost $30 billion. At least an equivalent
amount in value was transferred from consumers as a result of agricul-
tural policies then in existence. It was in this atmosphere that the United
States led the way toward the Uruguay Round and in the process pro-
posed a new departure in the negotiations; namely, the inclusion of do-
mestic subsidies and import quota restrictions on the agenda, along with
all other non-tariff agricultural trade barriers.
The United States, thus, had come a long way when it finally ap-
peared willing in the mid-1980s to link, fundamentally, its agricultural
policy with its international trade policy. The first step had been taken in
that direction in 1973 within the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA), when the domestic commodity programmes and interna-
tional affairs were combined under a single Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs. This did little to coordinate interdepartmental
trade matters and concerns, however, and the ghost of agricultural pro-
tectionism quickly reappeared with the early 1980s downturn in exports.
The basic change, therefore, with which the United States appeared
at Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1986 was the intent not only to integrate
its own agricultural and foreign policy objectives and to present a unified
position, but also to insist that all the farm policies and related agricul-
tural issues of each country or political bloc be put on the bargaining
table. Robert Paarlberg, in an excellent recent essay3 maintains that
Reagan Administration officials, Clayton Yeutter, U.S. Special Trade
Representative, and Daniel Amstutz, Undersecretary of Agriculture for
International Affairs, after defeat on their free-market proposals in the
1985 Farm Bill, sensed an opportunity to pursue their domestic objective
of reforming farm policy through an international negotiation abroad.
No doubt both were deeply committed to a basic restructuring of United
States farm policy. In fact, seldom in the history of the GATT negotia-
tions had the process and the potential outcome been so influenced by
major U.S. political personalities.
The United States had not had an abrupt conversion from protec-
tionism and, in fact, there was much talk that its opening position in the
Uruguay Round was a "bluff." Pressure groups campaigning for the re-
tention of agricultural protectionism were still strongly entrenched in
Washington, D.C. Nevertheless, there was a general recognition by the
3. ROBERT PAARLBERG, HARVARD CENTRE FOR INT'L AFFAIRS, WHY AGRICULTURE
BLOCKED THE URUGUAY ROUND: REVOLVING STRATEGIES OF A Two-LEVEL GAME (Apr. 1,
1991) (copy available from author).
[Vol. 28:761
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Congress and the Executive Branch of the high social costs of past mis-
takes in trade policies and the high price paid for uneconomic farm poli-
cies. But, in view of the strength of domestic opposition to major reform,
the position on agriculture adopted by the U.S. government in the Uru-
guay Round displayed considerable political courage.
The Tokyo Round, 1974-79, had been conducted during a period of
unparalleled expansion of agricultural trade. Unfortunately, the Uru-
guay Round began at a time of declining agricultural trade and, for the
United States, a declining relative share of that trade compared to that of
a decade earlier. For example, U.S. share of world wheat exports varied
between 40% and 50% for the decade 1974-83, but fell below 30% in
1986-87 as the Uruguay Round started. The challenge to the U.S. nego-
tiators was to discover methods of negotiating farm programme changes
throughout the world, including its own, which might rectify this
situation.
A variety of proposals were tabled in late 1987 and early 1988 for
the uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The U.S. proposal was for a
sweeping elimination of all trade-distorting agricultural subsidies by the
year 2000, or over a ten-year period (the so-called Zero Option). Was
this position a bluff, or were the Americans naive, or was this a bold eco-
political strategy? It seems unlikely that the U.S. Administration really
believed that the European Community and Japan would accept the Zero
Option. If this interpretation is correct, the first negotiating proposal,
tabled by the United States in Geneva in July 1987, was an ideological
trial balloon launched by the Administration in the hope that political
and economic winds would be favourable to achieving the desired result.
As has already been stated, agricultural preotectionism is deep-rooted;
farm lobbies and their allies have always been the stumbling block to
agricultural policy reform, both in America and other developed
countries.
Paarlberg proffers the persuasive argument that, for their own ulte-
rior motives, certain protectionist interests in the United States neverthe-
less supported the zero option in the secure knowledge that it would be
rejected by other parties to the negotiations and that it might possibly
torpedo the entire Round.4 Though this strategy might appear a bit
Machiavellian, one should never underestimate the latent physiocrats of
rural America and the die-hard protectionist supporters of commodity
programmes. There can be little doubt, however, that some elements in
4. Id. at 17 et seq.
1993]
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U.S. agriculture, alarmed by adverse public sentiment and concern over
the costs of current farm programmes, have for some time been in favour
of substantial policy reforms.
The political opportunity arose in the Uruguay Round to attempt
such reforms. Ambassador Yeutter, among others, was centre stage both
in framing the proposals and in conducting the actual negotiations. Most
knowledgeable policymakers agree on the disease; only the technical
remedy was at issue. But few ever believed in the shock therapy of zero
option. As with many of the ideological thrusts of the Reagan Adminis-
tration, the vulnerability of the U.S. position was overlooked, and the
mechanics of executing the "solution" were unsupported by the realpoli-
tik of American farm programmes. To repeat, the political clout still
wielded by agricultural protectionists, farm lobbies, farm fundamental-
ists, and other opponents of freer agricultural trade was underestimated
from the beginning of the Uruguay Round.
The U.S. position has been for some time that it is impossible to free
domestic agricultural markets while, at the same time, international mar-
kets continue to be distorted by the policy interventions of governments.
Dale Hathaway, former Under-Secretary of Agriculture in the USDA,
has observed that in the modem world domestic and international mar-
kets and policies are closely and extricably interlinked.5 The United
States, with its opening salvo at Punta del Este appeared to be willing to
forgo its past 50-year reliance on regulating its internal markets for the
greater goal of freer commodity and services trade on an international
scale.
The theme of potential expansion of markets was a recurring litany
in testimony supporting the U.S. position on the Uruguay Round. For
example, Ambassador Hills, in a March 1991 testimony supporting Fast-
track extension, said: "Agricultural reform of the kind the United States
has proposed would allow world agricultural exports to expand by $100
billion, or by one-third."6
Paarlberg has skillfully described the ensuing process as an interna-
tional negotiating venture at reforming US agricultural policy; and as an
attempt, conducted with like-minded officials abroad, both to weaken,
then to finesse, the domestic farm lobby opponents of reform at home.'
5. DALE E. HATHAWAY, INST. FOR INT'L ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURE AND THE GATT:
REWRITING THE RULES (Policy Analysis in Int'l Economics No. 20, 1987).
6. Hearings on Agricultural Trade Before the House of Representatives Comm. on Agriculture,
102d Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (March 13, 1991) (statement of Ambassador Carla Hills, Special Trade
Representative).
7. PAARLBERG, supra note 4, at I 1 et seq.
[Vol. 28:761
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The problem with this plan to outmaneuver domestic opposition to re-
form was that it united the opposition. Thus, from the moment when the
United States government chose to present agricultural reform as the
central element in the overall Uruguay Round GATT negotiations, U.S.
domestic farm lobby groups, with some distinct advantages on their side,
began their own strategy to protect themselves from this international
effort to reduce farm subsidies.
Hence, initially the general objective of the United States in the Uru-
guay Round was to guide world agriculture and trade toward a market-
oriented system which would be governed by stronger and more opera-
tionally effective GATT rules and disciplines, and ultimately to fully in-
tegrate agriculture into the GATT. Of major concern were long-range
reforms in agricultural policies which would result in freer international
markets for agricultural commodities. Ambassador Yeutter (later U.S.
Secretary of Agriculture), testifying before a key committee in the U.S.
House of Representatives on September 25, 1986 after the launching of
the Uruguay Round, pointed out that the terms of the Ministerial Decla-
ration-following seven months of preparatory discussion in Geneva-
had put all agricultural issues on the table in which "at the top of our list
is agricultural subsidies, which are hurting our efficient farmers and bust-
ing budgets around the world. We will also go after the full range of
market access restrictions affecting agricultural trade, including those
based on phoney health standards."8
Specifically, and in outline form, the US goals in the agricultural
sector as of July 1987 might be summarised as follows:
1. To establish a discipline over the use of export subsidies. The
United States sought to freeze existing subsidies with an agreed
timetable for phasing them out over a period of years. (The so-
called "standstill" and "rollback" provisions.)
2. To improve market access and to reduce trade barriers, including
quantitative restrictions. Non-tariff barriers, including animal
health and plant inspection requirements, were singled out for spe-
cial attention.
3. To strengthen the dispute settlement and enforcement processes,
including the development of improved arrangements for assuring
compliance.
4. To phase out all trade-distorting domestic subsidies and import
barriers over a 10-year period.
8. Testimony on the Results of the GA TT Ministerial. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade
of the House of Representatives Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 168-74 (Sept. 25,
1986) (statement of Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, United States Trade Representative).
1993]
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United States negotiators came away from the initial sessions of the
Uruguay Round on an optimistic note, perhaps relieved that the 92
GATT member countries had at last launched a new round of multilat-
eral negotiations. Ambassador Yeutter reported "I am now pleased to
report that we came away from the Punta del Este Ministerial meeting
having achieved all of the objectives we identified. Multilateral negotia-
tions will soon get underway on the full range of trade problems con-
fronting us."9
Offsetting any undue optimism, however, was the memory of past
negotiations and bargaining, particularly with the European negotiators,
who are under constant pressure from hard-line farm organisations such
as COPAN and COGECA. The Uruguay Round negotiations were ex-
pected to be tough because there was much at stake and much work to be
done. Producing a multilateral agreement on new trade rules and disci-
plines is always difficult. The United States, however, apparently deemed
this latest effort necessary to open significant new opportunities for
American agricultural exporters as well as to strengthen the global trad-
ing system so that all countries might compete on equal terms. In the
background of the United States negotiating position lay its own farm
policies, and there lurked U.S. farm organisations and farm commodity
groups, which would be constantly on the alert to prevent an erosion of
their interests during the coming years of negotiations. Many, including
the author of this article, were not fully convinced that the U.S. delega-
tion would be permitted to "go the distance" in substantially reducing
the United States' own farm support systems and the protection of com-
modity interests.
The original United States objectives and bargaining position during
the life of the Uruguay Round would be affected by two major forces:
the reaction of other countries, especially the European Community, to
its initial proposals; and the politics of agriculture in Washington.
Whether by accident or design, for the first time in the history of the
GATT a round of negotiations was scheduled to end simultaneously with
the passage of major U.S. legislation in the fall of 1990.
During late 1987, and most of 1988 the U.S. negotiation machinery
was at work: (1) Assessing the fallout from the initial proposal; (2) Con-
structing proposals for future discussion and negotiations; and (3) Un-
dertaking economic analyses to document various scenarios for future
bargaining.
9. Id. at 168.
[Vol. 28:761
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III. PROCESS VS. SUBSTANCE
Often in international affairs, the objectives sought by nations be-
come so enmeshed and identified with the techniques for attaining those
objectives that some unforeseen change in circumstances and events is
needed to move things off dead centre and toward a conclusion. Such an
anomaly or cataclysmic occurrence has never happened in GATT negoti-
ations. "Rounds" open, participants congregate at Geneva, negotiators
jockey for position at a pre-agreed locale, and midway-or, usually much
later-through the round, some serious paper is surfaced by a country
which ushers in a flurry of activities preparatory to the meeting of the
deadline for concluding this particular round. It has been no different
with the Uruguay Round.
This is not to say that there has been no urgency in the current
process, nor that the negotiating technique has been the same as that in
the Tokyo, the Kennedy, and other rounds. Indeed, the United States in
particular, and the Cairns Group (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Columbia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay) alongside it, have utilized a variety
of economic techniques and political tactics to move toward the accom-
plishment of objectives spelled out in the Ministerial Declaration at
Punta Del Este in 1986. From the beginning, the United States said that
agriculture was the top priority for the Uruguay Round. It also insisted
that the scope of the negotiations be broader than in the past. That is,
"tariff reductions" was not the issue but, instead, "substantial, progres-
sive reductions in agricultural support and protection" must be achieved.
This meant fundamental change in all agricultural and trade policies and
programmes, domestic and international.
Implied in the United States' position from the beginning was
"decoupling," or the separation of price or income payments to farmers
based on production of farm commodities. The idea appears simple but
is difficult to achieve and, contrary to implications in the current debate,
it has been around at least 50 years. Academic economists in the United
States were advocating decoupled payments as early as the 1950s, but
Congress for the most part has always ignored proposals containing the
concept. 10
The 1980s decoupling plan of Senator Rudy Boschwitz (Minne-
sota)-which did not include dairy and sugar-proposed to break the tie
between production of agricultural commodities and income support by
10. Robert D. Reinsel, Decoupling: Not a New Issue, 4 CHOICES 3d qtr. 1989, at 16-19 (1989).
1993]
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abolishing nonrecourse loans, allowing prices to be determined in the
market, paying farmers directly based on past production, and reducing
payments annually to some lower level over time. However, farmers in
the United States have always been quite skeptical of any concept that
divorces their income from price, acreage and yield, or the equivalent
phenomena on the animal side of production. As will be seen later in this
article, on the other hand, the 1990s and the Uruguay Round were not
"normal" times, and U.S. policy makers were being forced into new ave-
nues of thinking and action on farm issues and trade.
In November 1988 the United States submitted a Framework Pro-
posal which was specifically designed to set the agenda for future negoti-
ations, to serve as a guide for the forthcoming Mid-Term Review of
progress made during the first two years of the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions, and to outline a working plan for the final two years. A central
element of the Framework Proposal was the "tariffication" of all non-
tariff barriers to agricultural trade, i.e., that all non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
should be converted to their tariff equivalents and bound. Combined
with the tariffication proposal was its natural corollary that all tariff
equivalents (TEs) be subject to a phased reduction leading to eventual
abolition. Despite this attempt by the United States to advance the Uru-
guay Round by clarifying the agenda for the negotiations on agriculture,
the contracting parties, meeting for the Mid-Term Review in Montreal in
December 1988, could not agree upon objectives, let alone the proce-
dures to be followed in achieving them. The United States, supported by
the Cairns Group (CG), wanted an agreement to achieve a market-ori-
ented, barrier-free agricultural grading system. The US-CG proposal
contrasted with that of the European Community, which continued to
refuse substantial alteration of its support policies and which, in line with
European history, preferred market sharing arrangements. An impasse
ensued, but not a complete breakdown in negotiations. A pause was con-
venient in any case, to permit the "digestion" of the U.S. election results
(including the election of a new President) in November 1988.
IV. YEUTTER AND THE U.S. COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL
At one critical point prior to the ill-fated Montreal Conference, Am-
bassador Yeutter, still acting as Special Trade Representative (STR), sig-
naled a willingness to move away from the Zero Option and, with the
Cairns Group, compromise towards a more realistic position, or a short-
term roll-back of agricultural supports, export subsidies, and trade barri-
ers. United States farm groups, led by sugar and dairy protectionists,
[Vol. 28:761
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lobbied the Secretary of Agriculture successfully to have Yeutter persist
with the Zero Option. Specifically, the Chief Economist of the national
Milk Producers Federation expressed concern that a short-term reduc-
tion in support barriers and price supports of 10% for two years could
cost the U.S. dairy industry $2 billion. He added: "why should U.S.
agriculture not be alarmed at the administration's talk of possibly em-
bracing something less than its long-term objective? Why should we
think something different is going to happen, given that this administra-
tion has been more critical of basic agricultural programs that previous
administrations? Why should we not be concerned this time around?""
Early in 1989, the appointment by the incoming Bush Administra-
tion of Dr. Yeutter as Secretary of Agriculture, moving him from the
post of Special Trade Representative under the Reagan Administration,
appeared to reinforce the resolve of the United States toward hard bar-
gaining to lower agricultural supports and to foster liberal agricultural
trade policies. Yeutter's unique background vis-a-vis European farm
groups, his excellent knowledge of U.S. agribusiness and trade, his well-
known ability to achieve political compromise, all coupled with his
toughness at insisting on movement toward fundamental change when
the economic facts warrants such change, placed him a strong auxiliary
position in the new U.S. Administration. Yeutter's new appointment
was a signal of the strength of the U.S. commitment to agricultural pol-
icy reform, as well as a test of how acceptable a reduced level of protec-
tion might be to agricultural interests in the United States. If political
support for his position became uncertain, which it ultimately did, the
U.S. commitment would inevitably soften.
The new Special Trade Representative, Ms. Carla Hills, along with
Yeutter, could and would continue to urge negotiators in the Uruguay
Round to reduce agricultural supports substantially, and to ensure more
liberal agricultural and trade policies for the future. Over the next two
years one could accurately predict inexorable pressure by the United
States both at home and abroad to adopt the appropriate political tech-
niques in order to attain its basic objectives. As was soon evident, some
modifications in those objectives themselves would be tabled in order to
keep the negotiations moving.
The delayed Mid-Term Agreement of April 1989 in Geneva sal-
vaged the negotiations from complete break-down. In order to preserve
11. The Food and Fibre Letter, (Natural Milk Producers' Federation Newsletter) Nov. 1988
vol. 8, at 3 (quoting remarks of Peter Vitaltano).
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the basic objectives agreed to in the Punta del Este Declaration, particu-
larly that of establishing "a fair and market-oriented trading system," the
United States accepted what was characterized as a language change
from "elimination of all trade distortions" to "substantial, progressive
reductions in agriculture support and protection sustained over an agreed
period of time." Actually, this form of words was a cover for a basic
shift in the U.S. position. The new President, George Bush, had fudged
away from the Zero Option in agriculture in order to buy time on other
aspects of the Uruguay Round negotiations, but a tough stance on agri-
culture persisted.
The Mid-Term Agreement, at U.S. insistence, also called for
strengthened GATT rules pertaining to agricultural trade, and it estab-
lished a work plan for the rest of 1989. In addition to proposals on the
fundamental issue of market access and subsidies, participants were to
advance proposals on a variety of other topics, including food security
concerns, special and differential treatment for developing countries, and
ways to counter the possible negative effects of the reform process on net
food importing countries. 2 The agreement also stated that by the end of
1990 participants would agree to a long-term reform programme and the
period for its implementation. In keeping with the programme estab-
lished in the Mid-Term Agreement, the United States submitted a paper
in July 1990 which outlined a procedure to convert all non-tariff barriers
to tariffs with the understanding that tariffs would be substantially and
progressively reduced. The rationale for this approach was that tariffs
have historically been the preferred means of protection under the
GATT.13
Also, in accordance with the terms of the Mid-Term Agreement, the
United States tabled at Geneva on October 25, 1989 its Comprehensive
Agricultural Proposal, preparatory to the final 14 months of negotia-
tions. The U.S. was the first nation to do so. This latest proposal out-
lined in considerable detail policies to be included in the phase-out of
agricultural protection over a ten-year period. The U.S. Zero Option re-
mained intact in the Comprehensive Agriculture Proposal. Ideological
positions, once taken by great powers, die reluctantly. But many observ-
ers, including the author, had little doubt that the United States would
ultimately retreat from the hard line Zero Option. This Comprehensive
Proposal, in the words of Secretary Yeutter, "is designed to level the
12. LARRY DEATON ET AL., USDA, GATT TRADE LIBERALIZATION: THE U.S. PROPOSAL 1-
9 (Agricultural Information Bulletin No. 596, 1990).
13. Id. at 5.
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playing field for farmers, so they compete fairly against one another in-
stead of against governmental treasuries, in order to feed this growing
population with a rational set of international trade rules."14
The U.S. Comprehensive Proposal was tabled after one of the most
intensive periods of agricultural and trade policy analysis in the history
of GATT. The Economic Research Service, USDA, alone, lists 228
studies done by that agency as of September 1991.15 Many other major
and minor analyses were done by public and private, domestic and inter-
national agencies. The salient feature of most of these studies was a gen-
eral support of the United States position: That agriculture is, indeed,
the most protected and distorted sector in the global economy; That gov-
ernments spend billions of dollars each year to fund policies which are
detrimental to the welfare of farmers, consumers and taxpayers; And
that the entire world would benefit by agricultural trade liberalisation,
though some farmers and consumers (e.g., primarily those in LDCs)
would lose.
Despite all of the "proof" by research studies of resource misalloca-
tion, of the protection of vested interests, and of the enormous costs of
farm programmes, lobbyists and politicians select only those programs
that support their own positions. Hence, U.S. opponents of agricultural
trade liberalisation continued their efforts at demonstrating the ill effects
of a rapid dismantling1 6 of government farm programmes. Results of
two studies were selected for particular prominence by farm groups:17
By one estimate (Roningen), even in a world of multilateral liberalisa-
tion, the elimination of farm subsidies would still cost U.S. farm produ-
cers $17 billion; and by another study (Drabenstott), more than $5
billion. These types of data were gleaned from the numerous models and
research by academic, government, and private economists, and were
fodder for the anti-liberalisation lobbyists. Added to these, special inter-
est group commissions formed their own studies. Unfortunately, in such
periods, objective analysis gives way to convenient fact finding, and often
the data needed to support objectivity is difficult to find.
14. Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture (Policy Statement Release of the USDA, Wash-
ington, D.C.) Oct. 25, 1989.
15. CARL NABBS-ZENO & NINA M. SWAN, USDA, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RESEARCH ON AGRI-
CULTURAL TRADE POLICY REFORM (1991).
16. For example, see Extending International Trading Rules of.Agriculture" Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. of Finance, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1991).
17. VERNON 0. RONINGEN & DIXIT M. PARVEEN, USDA, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF AG-
RICULTURAL POLICY REFORMS IN INDUSTRIAL MARKET ECONOMIES 30 (1989); Mark Drabenstott
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An entire article could be devoted alone to an analysis of the U.S.
Comprehensive Proposal of October 1989.18 Suffice to say that the docu-
ment repeated the U.S. commitment to a more market-oriented trading
environment in which all countries would be able to compete on rela-
tively equal terms, according to their comparative advantage, and not by
government support. It reaffirmed the belief of the U.S. government that
trade liberalisation would increase the volume of agricultural trade and
eliminate artificially low prices which are the result of subsidised
overproduction.
The Proposal was presented in a 21-page, single-spaced document.19
Four main sections comprised an integrated package, and were designed
to prevent reforms in one area from being offset by programmes in an-
other. A special section on differential treatment for developing coun-
tries was designed for countries which can demonstrate a special need.
Three annexes outlined product coverage, types of subsidies to be prohib-
ited, and a classification of internal policies.
The Comprehensive Proposal formed the political and economic ba-
sis for the United States argument during the last scheduled year of the
negotiations. Particularly importantly, the United States continued to
press its tariffication proposal during this period. In the meantime,
United States farm politicians spent a good part of that year in Washing-
ton drafting the 1990 Farm Bill. Even though U.S. GATT negotiators
had let it be known, "We are not writing the 1990 Farm Bill in Geneva,"
the simultaneous processes and the interlocking considerations could not
be ignored. The United States, as if to strengthen its position in Geneva,
in late October 1990 passed a farm bill which drove home two relevant
points for European observers. First, there were large spending cuts-an
estimated $40 billion over 5 years-through a variety of changes in pro-
gramme operation. In this the United States was "leading by example."
However, at least part of the spending cuts were forced by the overriding
necessity of reducing the federal budget deficit. Second, there was con-
tinued authorization of export subsidies through a re-authorization of the
Export Enhancement Programme (EEP) and a Market Promotion Pro-
gramme (MPP). All this was buttressed, of course, with a continuation
of Section 22, which the United States had as "decision bait" in its Com-
prehensive Proposal. These aspects of the Farm Bill might be viewed as
18. See Office of Special Trade Representative, Submission of the United States on Comprehen-
sive Long-Term Agricultural Reform, a document tabled by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive in Geneva, Switz. at GATT, (Oct. 25, 1989) (copies available at the Office of Special Trade
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counter-attacking foreign agricultural export subsidies, and might be in-
terpreted as, "If we can't negotiate the elimination of export subsidies
and similar supports, then we shall match your spending!"
V. PRESSURE FOR NEGOTIATING MAINTAINED
As time fast slipped away, specificity in the negotiations was ur-
gently needed. Again, the United States, after temporary delays caused
mainly by domestic budgetary problems, led the way by tabling, on Octo-
ber 15, 1990 its formal proposal to reduce trade-distorting domestic agri-
cultural subsidies by 75% over a 10-year period. An integral part of this
proposal was the call for a 90% reduction in export subsidies over two
years. Thus the proposal assumed a more urgent nature with respect to
export subsidies, a position in stark contrast with that of the European
Community, which argued that export subsidies should be reduced only
in terms of overall levels of support.
Another specific part of the U.S. proposal was the renewed emphasis
on the tariffication of market access barriers. All non-tariff barriers
would be converted to tariffs expressed in ad valorem percentages, and
would be "bound" along with other existing tariffs. The major innova-
tion was that whereas until then the United States had pressed for the
elimination of import barriers within 10 years, the goal was now reduced
to a 75% cut over the same period (one facet of abandoning the Zero
Option) with a final ceiling rate of not more than 50% at valorem by the
year 2000. Tariff quotas would be used as a transitional mechanism for
products currently subject to non-tariff barriers or subject to an import
tax in particular cases such as rice to Japan. In such cases a minimum
access level of 3% (of total domestic consumption) would be established
and subsequently expanded by 75% over ten years. The proposal would
allow for a tariff "snapback" to prevent market disruption if imports of a
particular commodity exceeded 120% of the imports of that commodity
during the previous year.
Although this U.S. proposal was less aggressive than earlier posi-
tions taken, and even though the United States continually falls short of
living up to its own stated farm policy objectives, the proposal fitted the
overall strategy of removing government from the market by decoupling
income support from the production of agricultural commodities. As
stated earlier in this article, the original strategy of the Reagan Adminis-
tration was to use the Uruguay Round as a negotiating forum to pursue
the objective of domestic agricultural policy reform. Decoupling was
part of that strategy. Decoupling as offered by the U.S. Office of the
1993]
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Special Trade Representative in the negotiations, however, took on yet
another different meaning: for negotiating purposes, trade distorting
programmes must be removed, but direct payments to farmers could still
be made if they were not tied to production and did not distort trade. It
is important to reiterate that the concept of decoupling is complex and
carries with it a variety of meanings and potential ramifications.
Negotiations on subsidies proceeded on the basis of the negotiating
framework reached at the mid-point of the Uruguay Round, i.e., whether
to categorize subsidies as prohibited (red light category); permissible but
actionable or countervailable (yellow light category); or permissible and
nonactionable (green light category). The United States focused most of
its attention on the red light and so-called dark amber categories (a varia-
tion on yellow which would make remedial action more automatic when
certain kinds or levels of subsidisation are present). In contrast, others
focused on rules for developing and expanding the green light category.
At the Ministerial-level meeting in Brussels (December 1990) the
United States expressed its continued strong opposition to the green light
category. Some participants signaled a willingness to consider an agree-
ment that did not have such a category, but others insisted that there
needed to be nonactionable treatment for certain kinds of assistance.
As the Uruguay Round progressed, U.S. farmers and farm groups
obviously visualized successful negotiations as pre-empting their birth-
right, or price-income franchise, and as inimitable to their long term wel-
fare. The vital difference between current attempts (including Uruguay
Round negotiations) and former proposals to decouple payments to
farmers from production is that never before have direct payments based
on production been so large, the linkages among domestic and world
markets so complete, and the concentration of payments so focused on
large and seemingly financially successful producers. It might also be
added that never before in the United States have farm programmes and
their costs been under greater scrutiny by the media and by the general
public. The basic question still remains: How do we permit the market
to set prices and to signal the need for changes in resource use, while
offering some assistance to farmers to deal with vagaries of weather and
problems caused by structural excess capacity and other issues?20
A summary of the basic element of the U.S. proposal as of October
15, 1990 is shown in Table 3.2. In addition to the decoupling idea, there
20. Reinsel, supra note 11, at 18.
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were the milder provisions of low-level protection through the transpar-
ent means of tariffs and the treatment of agricultural commodities under
GATT as any other traded goods. Consistent with its overall approach,
in this proposal, the United States advocated the eventual removal of the
exceptional treatment of agriculture under GATT including Article
XI.2(c)(i), which allows countries to impose quantitative import restric-
tions as part of supply-management systems. The United States reiter-
ated a willingness to part with its beloved Section 22 (not a specific part
of its latest proposal) in order to obtain its general strategic goals of the
Uruguay Round, which was to phase out all import barriers, provided
that trading partners would reciprocate. Moreover, the agricultural offer
had considerable relevance to an understanding of the United States' po-
sition in other negotiating groups.
Yet, substance was once again giving way to process in the GATT.
As pressure from the United States increased on the European Commu-
nity to table a meaningful proposal to reduce agricultural support, farm-
ers, farmers' organisations, and farm supporters in many European
countries mounted demonstrations against change. In France, Italy, and
even England during late October 1990, the object of such demonstration
groups appeared to be to block concessions to the American proposal.
Despite all this, United States negotiators and their Cairns Group allies
maintained the pressure for reform.
At the same time, one could sense that the United States was posi-
tioning itself for some type of compromise. An important question arises
as to why the United States waited so long to back away from the Zero
Option. There is no single answer. It will be remembered that Ambassa-
dor Yeutter and the U.S. negotiators entered the Uruguay Round with
great determination to use the international bargaining forum to restruc-
ture U.S. farm policy, and liberalise world agricultural commodity mar-
kets. A strong opening position was taken to that effect. Yeutter
continued to argue forcefully for that position at Montreal in December
1988; he also gave it his "best shot" at Geneva in the spring of 1989.
Later, when he indicated a willingness to compromise, certain U.S. farm
lobbies got busy and he was advised to stick to the Zero Option. Thus,
one answer to the above question is that apparently Yeutter and the
United States team miscalculated the Europeans, underestimating their
strength and tenacity. On the American side, he was betrayed by the
unwillingness of some U.S. agricultural interests to compromise. There
was no political intrigue to undermine the U.S. position in the GATT.
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There is no great "mystery" as to this outcome, unless there be mystery
in the political activities of a democratically elected government.
THREATS, CRISES AND DELAYS
By November 1, 1990, negotiations had deteriorated into a war of
nerves after the European Community had failed to produce a trade
liberalising offer, which had been due October 15 at Geneva. In fact,
apparently the EC Ministers wanted the EC Commission to make
changes in the Commission's earlier proposal. A meeting of the Minis-
ters in Rome October 27-28, 1990 came and went without mention of the
crisis in the agricultural negotiations.
The United States threatened trade war in an attempt to force the
European Community to table its proposals. Secretary of Agriculture
Yeutter threatened that U.S. farmers would keep their taxpayer support
to ensure access to international markets in the face of subsidised EC
competition. "The probability is we're going to have a war of subsidies.
That is almost inevitable."12 1
Supporting Yeutter's thesis were data released from the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO), which pointed out that the United States had
spent $32 billion (U.S.) on farm supports of all kinds in 1989, compared
to the EC's $53 billion (U.S.) and Japan's $33 billion (U.S.). But, with
the passing of the US 1990 Farm Bill the GAO pointed out that U.S.
farmers could get up to $40.8 billion (U.S.) per year.22
Thus, at the "countdown" of the Uruguay Round, the United States
had a strong agricultural position on the table that would represent a
major advance by gradually removing most policies that disrupt trade
and which would treat agriculture equally with industrial goods under
GATT rules. An apparent softening of the United States position on
export subsidies, however, worried some countries in the Cairns Group.
There was concern in some quarters that in order to negotiate a deal with
Europe, the United States would have to make even further compromises
and to retreat substantially from its proposal of October 15. Certain ele-
ments in United States agriculture, moreover, were not eager for any
agreement that would eliminate the protection which had been part of
their expectations and planning processes for many decades.
Countdown became "breakdown" at the December 1990 meeting of
21. Stephen K. Knight, US. Threatens Trade War Over Subsidies, NAT'L Bus. REv., Oct. 26,
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the GATT in Brussels, and the flurry of events that occurred and fol-
lowed are indicative of the agricultural trade reforms that might ulti-
mately result from the Uruguay Round of negotiations. The United
States sent several of its top trade officials to that meeting and, even
though fruitful discussions were held outside of agriculture, a deadlock in
that area provoked a suspension of the talks. Deadlock centred around
the so-called Hellstrom proposal23 which, essentially, proposed 30% re-
ductions on internal support, border protection, and export subsidies
over five years.
Even though this proposal fell short of United States objectives in a
number of areas, including the level of reduction commitments, the
United States joined other countries in expressing willingness to negoti-
ate on the basis of the Hellstrom text. That might lead to serious talks, it
was thought. The European Community was unwilling to accept this as
the basis for negotiations on agriculture and at that stage, the Cairns
Group and some LDCs walked out of the meeting.
In sum as to process, or tactics, it can be said quite confidently that,
up to and including the December 1990 meeting of Ministers in Brussels
to negotiate final results, the United States had been more comprehensive
and more methodical in the Uruguay round with respect to the econom-
ics and politics of agricultural trade than at any time in its history of
trade negotiations. The United States entered the final phase of bargain-
ing in a very strong position to press for long-term agricultural reform
and for more liberal agricultural trade policies. Nevertheless, the Ameri-
cans, as well as the Cairns Group, probably underestimated European
intransigence toward change in agriculture, as embodied in the Common
Agriculture Policy. This issue is debatable. The writer's position is that
the U.S. and the members of the Cairns Group should have been pre-
pared for all contingencies in light of past GATT rounds and in view of
the history of high agricultural protection in much of Europe,24 fortified
in many regions by physiocratic philosophy and reinforced recently by
the prominence given to issues such as self-sufficiency, food safety and
'green' or environmental arguments-all demanding a status quo on the
farm and in rural areas.
23. Mats Hillstrom, GATT "Non-Paper" on Agriculture, (Dec. 6, 1990) (copies available from
the European Commission in Brussels, Belg.)
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VII. TRADE POLITICS AND THE NEW FAST TRACK
At the beginning of 1991, the attention of the United States and the
world was temporarily diverted by the Gulf War and away from the
GATT Uruguay Round and other matters. But not for long. It would
be inappropriate in an account such as this article to attempt to analyse
or to describe all the issues bearing on the United States' agricultural
position as the year began and as the parties attempted to re-establish a
negotiating dialogue after the breakdown. Several events, however, are
worthy of brief treatment and this final section will centre on them.
These will be designated as the Dunkel Shuttle, the McSharry Mission,
the Yeutter Resignation, the new Fast Track, and the implication of a
GATT agreement for United States agriculture.
Most agricultural interests in the United States, whether or not they
support the Administration's position in the Uruguay Round, neverthe-
less expected some movement toward the reduction of protectionism
through the negotiations. The same could be said of European agricul-
tural interests, though their bargaining position had not been so well de-
fined. At this time, the United States had the advantage of having just
enacted the 1990 Farm Bill, which further reduced domestic assistance to
the agricultural sector and called for a one billion dollar increase in ex-
port subsidies if GATT were to fail.
In this atmosphere GATT Director General Arthur Dunkel began a
series of discussions aimed at the resumption of the Uruguay Round
talks. His shuttling between negotiating groups and other officials and
his effective diplomacy helped promote technical discussions in Geneva,
which were necessary prior to the resumption of political talks. Such
technical discussions, had they been held prior to the ill-fated Brussels
meeting in December 1990, might have clarified the meaning of just what
the negotiating parties had put on the table. Dunkel on one occasion in
early 1991 stated bluntly, ("Agriculture: the situation cannot continue:
... the reform of agricultural trade has become a central point not only
in the Uruguay Round agenda, but also in the internal debates on eco-
nomic and social policies practically everywhere."2 On another occa-
sion, his patience wearing thin, he expressed exasperation at United
States' and European Community's attempts to place blame on the other
25. GATT Director General Arthur Dunkel, Address at the Annual Meeting of the World
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for lack of progress on agricultural talks.2 6
Simultaneously with the Dunkel Shuttle Mr. Ray McSharry, EC
Farm Commissioner, was busy prescribing his proposals for reform of
the Community's Common Agricultural Policy. The "reflections" paper
entitled, "Communication of the Commission to the Council: The De-
velopment and Future of the CPP," raised all the old questions of assist-
ance to agriculture in Europe and its costs.27 Meanwhile, in the United
States, the politics of GATT were centring on the position of Secretary of
Agriculture and Congressional debate about extension of Fast-track
legislation.
The move by Secretary Yeutter to Chairman of the Republican
Party March 1, 1991 sent mixed signals on the GATT negotiations. Was
this a signal of retreat or of slowdown by the Americans? His knowledge
of the agricultural issues, his position relative to trade policy, and his
long-time association with the European "mind" on agriculture had
made him a formidable factor to be dealt with by all parties in the Uru-
guay Round. His departure no doubt pleased many European farm
groups, as well as those commodity groups in United States agriculture
who had basically opposed the Yeutter position on farm policy for many
years and who favoured high levels of assistance and protection.
Secretary Yeutter's move to a new position must be interpreted as
inspired by the stage reached in the Uruguay Round. He had directly
and indirectly been involved with the negotiations and the agricultural
agenda since July 1, 1985, first as Ambassador at STR and from January
1989 to March 1991 as Secretary of Agriculture. He had led the fight to
fundamentally reform U.S. farm policy, first on a domestic level, then
through GATT negotiation. On occasion he appeared willing to com-
promise the United States' hard line position in Geneva but, that seemed
politically inexpedient or unacceptable. There appeared to be no mystery
about his departure other than a question whether President Bush and
Mr. Yeutter's successor, Mr. Edward Madigan, would pursue agricul-
tural policy reform and trade liberalization with the same zeal and
vigour.
No doubt, Mr. Madigan, who became US Secretary of Agriculture
March 12, 1991, could speak with more political authority about farm
issues, having been elected from a farm district in Illinois for 18 years.
26. GAT Director General Arthur Dunkel, Address to the European Atlantic Group,
London, Eng. (May 15, 1991).
27. EC Farm Commissioner Ray McSharry, Communication of the Commission to the Coun-
cil: The Development and Future of the CPP, (Feb. 1, 1991) (Com(91) 100 Final Brussels, Belg.).
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For 16 of those years, he was on the Agriculture Committee, 8 as the
ranking Republican. His standing with farmers was high at the time of
appointment. His standing was reinforced by the fact that he was an
elected official, a matter with which Dr. Yeutter, who was not, sometime
had to deal. Madigan was faced immediately with a major problem in
the dairy industry and had to argue against quick fixes in U.S. dairy pol-
icy."8 The dairy lobby took advantage of this short term crisis to restate
its opposition to the liberalizing provisions of the U.S. Uruguay Round
proposal.29
Other farm lobbyists and farm groups hostile to the Administration
in GATT had won a victory of sorts and would inevitably expect a soft-
ening of the hard line. The Zero Option was history. As domestic and
foreign policy issues came and went in 1991, the Uruguay Round was no
longer the priority issue of the Bush Administration, and Mr. Madigan's
profile on trade issues would be kept low. At the Washington Agricul-
tural Establishment, emphasis was on a prevention of further damage to
the U.S. negotiating position from within. The bureaucracy was quiet.
Thus, the question can be raised again, as it has been at other places
in this article. For all the talk about freer international trade, the lower-
ing of government assistance, and the restructuring of agriculture poli-
cies, just how committed were United States negotiators? How far was
the United States willing to go in order to attain its objectives? To be
sure, the United States farm bills of 1985 and 1990 moved unilaterally in
the direction of freeing up markets and toward reducing the cost of farm
programmes. In the 1990 bill, yields continued to be "frozen" on base
acreage, and the yield base updated, thus supporting the decoupling of
income from farm production. The U.S. Congress had agreed to reduce
farm support by $13.5 billion over the next five years. At the same time
however, the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) had an open faucet,
and Section 22 and Section 30130 were fully operative.
28. Edward Madigan, US Dairy Policy: Pointing it in the Right Direction, 16 CHoicEs 3d qtr.
1991, at 4-6.
29. Hearings Before the House of Representatives Comm. on Agriculture, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
912 (May 13, 1991) (statement of Peter Vitaliano, Director of Policy Analysis, National Milk Produ-"
cers' Federation).
30. Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2462 (West Supp. 1992). Section 301 covers unfair
trade practices by foreign governments affecting U.S. products. These often are cases that can not be
covered by the escape clause, dumping, counterveiling duties, or Section 337 [Trade Act of 1974,
§ 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988)] of the same act. The Section 301 cases are administered by the
President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (STR), and many have involved com-
plaints against the EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
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At the same time, the Fast-track31 debate revealed much of the pro-
tectionist sentiment that has existed for a long time in rural America.
Fast-track authority for an additional two years, until June 1993, was
given by the Congress to the President in late May 1991. So another
major hurdle was overcome toward keeping the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions on course. From a United States perspective, attention could now
be turned to the negotiations and, more seriously, to the implications for
the United States agricultural sector of an agreement at Geneva. What
that agreement would be, of course would have to be negotiated before its
impact could be assessed. In the meantime, the domestic farm lobby was
taking advantage of the stalled negotiations and the two-year U.S. Fast-
track extension by pursuing subsidy guarantees for various farm
groups.32
Academics, government economists, farm organisations, and com-
modity groups in the United States in the spring and summer of 1991
continued their politico-economic analyses of the potential fallout; the
possible gains and losses from various scenarios of the Uruguay Round.
In late 1991 one analysis in particular was relevant for our purpose in
this article: the study by the Office of Economics, USDA, entitled "Eco-
nomic Implications of the Uruguay Round for US Agriculture. '33 This
study was undertaken principally to clarify the last U.S. proposal in the
Uruguay Round (that of October 15, 1990) and to present an analysis of
the economic implications of the Uruguay Round for U.S. agriculture.34
Specifically, the United States was not proposing that support to
producers be eliminated. As has already been pointed out, in the Uru-
guay Round GATT negotiations, the United States never proposed the
elimination of all producer support, but only of that which is tied to out-
put-increasing incentives (in GATT parlance, "green" policy instruments
do not present a problem).
Another vital implication of the U.S. proposal is that a reduction in
farm subsidies does not necessarily imply commensurate reductions in
producer prices-because market prices are expected to rise. This aspect
31. Under Fast-track legislation, Congress gives the President authority to negotiate with for-
eign governments without meddling in the process or second-guessing the deals being made. After
the negotiation has been completed and in order that the "package" or "deal" become legally bind-
ing, the Congress must vote yes or no on the entire agreement and cannot vote on items selectively.
32. PAARLBERG, supra note 4, at 28-29.
33. OFFICE OF ECONOMICS, USDA, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND FOR
US AGRICULTURE (1991); see also, National Center for Food and Agriculture, Should Agriculture
Go with the GATT? Policy of Agriculture Resources for the Future (Apr. 8, 1991); Determining
Winners and Losers from a GATT Agreement: The Importance of Base Periods and Rules, GATT
research paper 91-GATT2, CARD (May 1991) (research paper issued from Iowa State University).
34. OFFICE OF ECONOMICS, USDA, supra note 34, at 6-8.
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of the proposal is so important that the section of the USDA report ex-
plaining it is reproduced verbatim as Appendix 3.A1. This is a key ele-
ment of the United States' position in the ongoing attempt at policy
reform. It has been emphasised both for the domestic agenda of U.S.
farm groups as well as for other GATT negotiation participants, particu-
larly in Europe.
This report, which obviously had been written to assuage the anxie-
ties of the U.S. farm community, goes into further analytical detail as to
how U.S. agriculture will benefit significantly from a Uruguay Round
agreement along the lines of the suggested U.S. Proposal. The principal
clarifying features are that:
(1) Even though support levels might remain higher elsewhere, United
States producers would gain from subsidy reductions;
(2) United States competitiveness would be enhanced;
(3) A GATT agreement would not expose United States producers to
large market shocks;
(4) An agreement would not change United States food safety
regulations;
(5) The agreement would give credit to the United States for actions
taken in the 1985 and 1990 farm bills to reduce subsidies;
(6) Authority over United States agricultural policy decisions would
remain in Washington.
The study makes a 5-year projection of the U.S. proposal of October
1990 from 1986-88 base period levels of support, but with implementa-
tion deferred until 1992-96. Moreover, the study results indicate pro-
jected budget savings over 5 years in excess of the losses suffered by
adversely affected producer groups like sugar and dairy-i.e. a net wel-
fare gain would remain even after the gainers had compensated the
losers. Finally, the aggregate effects of a GATT agreement along the
lines of the U.S. Proposal would permit an increase in U.S. farm income
because prices and production would be generally higher. By 1996, cash
farm income for United States agriculture would be at least $1-$2 billion
higher than under baseline assumptions. United States farm product ex-
ports would be $6-$8 billion higher.35
CONCLUSION
The United States, despite a checkered and dubious record on agri-
cultural protection dating back to the 1920s, nevertheless came into the
Uruguay Round of GATT in 1986 apparently determined to change
35. Id. at 31-32.
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things. It was determined to change not only its own but also the world's
propensity toward subsidies, supports, and all types of assistance which
had seen the average level of protection in agriculture rise substantially
since World War II. The United States was apparently willing to place
everything, including Section 22, on the bargaining table in order to ef-
fectuate domestic agricultural policy reform-that is, to reduce public
commitment to costly farm price and income support policies of the past.
The United States Administration, with backing from Congress, passed
Fast-track legislation, and its negotiators, along with the Cairns group,
pressured the European Community to move its agricultural sector for-
ward toward a freer trade era for agricultural commodities.
Only with the departure of Secretary of Agriculture Clayton Yeutter
did the United States seem to falter in its determination to move into a
new era in its combined agricultural and trade policies. Many of the old
questions about the power of United States farm lobbies began to resur-
face. How could it be that agricultural subsidies continue to be large
even with the decline in farm numbers and with the reduced agricultural
vote? Some would find it strange that the political power of agriculture
seems to increase with the diminution in its relative size. Traditional
economic science seems unable to explain this phenomenon.36 Would
the outcome of Geneva be worth the effort of the past five years?
The last half of 1991 was highly important for the Uruguay Round
of GATT as well as for the future of United States agriculture. Consider-
able understanding had been generated about the problems and issues,
and some progress was made on resolving differences, but these would be
swept aside unless there were an agreement. The daily ebb and flow of
GATT developments as this article is being written (November 1991)
provides little information to an outsider as to what is going on in Ge-
neva. One good sign for the Americans, however, is there appear to be
strong differences developing among the European parties.
What if there is a less than successful outcome in the Uruguay
36. KYM ANDERSON & YUJIRo HAYAMI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGRICULTURAL
PROTECTION: AN EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, (Sydney, et al. eds., 1986). As the relative importance
of agriculture declines, the cost of supporting it is spread over a growing non-agricultural population
within which the costs of organised opposition to farm subsidies are such that most people choose to
opt out (or free ride). Also, Anderson and Hayami present compelling empirical evidence to back
their hypothesis that the relationship between agricultural protection and compatative advantage (as
reflected by agriculture's relative importance in the economy) is inverse. Id. Tullock and Hillman in
their chapter, Public Choice and Agriculture: An American Example, have explained through public
choice theory why a dwindling number of American farmers have maintained political power. But
where is economic theory in all this? Is there an accepted political theory that explains it? Gordon
Tullock & Jimmye S. Hillman, Public Choice and Agriculture: An American Example, in 3 IsSUES IN
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 98-118 (Macmillan eds. 1991) (chapter 5 of the volume).
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Round? The United States can point to the large adjustments in internal
farm subsidies made since 1986-88 as a result of the 1985 and 1990 farm
and budget legislation. Moreover, it can contend that U.S. agricultural
tariffs and import protection for most products are low. And, on the
important subject of farm export subsidies, United States agriculture,
while substantially dependent on foreign markets, especially in cereals,
can survive in a continuing struggle with its chief competitors.
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APPENDIX 3.A1
Subsidy Reductions Do Not Mean Large Cuts in Support Prices*
First, internal subsidies subject to reduction include market price
support, direct payments tied to production, and input subsidies. For
market price support and direct payments, the level of support to be re-
duced is the product of the price gap (between the support price and a
fixed reference price) and the quantity that receives support. Thus, this
form of support could be reduced by cutting the support price or the
quantity receiving support. Alternatively, other subsidies could be re-
duced. Therefore, a reduction in internal subsidies does not mean that
support prices such as target prices and loan rates would necessarily be
cut.
Second, even if the cut were made only in the support price, the
percentage reduction would be applied to the price gap, not the support
price. For example, if the support price were $100/ton and the reference
price $60/ton, the price gap would be $40/ton. A 75 per cent reduction
in the price gap would result in a support price of $70/ton [$60/ton +
(.25 X $40/ton)]. Therefore, a 30 per cent reduction in the support price
would achieve a 75% reduction in the price gap.
For United States producers of wheat, feed grains, rice, and cotton,
the quantity of production receiving support declines as market prices
rise and programme participation falls. To the extent that a GATT
agreement raises market prices and programme participation falls,
computed support automatically declines. For voluntary programmes,
this tends to lessen or eliminate the need to reduce the price gap or re-
duce production eligible for support by other means to meet GATT
commitments.
* Source: Office of Economics, USDA, "Economic Implications of the Uruguay Round for
US Agriculture," Washington, DC, May 1991, p. 7.
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TABLE 3.2
SUMMARY OF KEY ELEMENTS OF US AGRICULTURAL PROPOSAL
TO GATT, OCTOBER 15, 1990
Export Subsidies
* reduce export subsidies on primary agricultural products by 90 per cent
over 10 years,
* export subsidies on processed products to be phased-out in 6 years,
* negotiate specific commitments on quantities exported and budget out-
lays regarding such subsidies.
Market Access
* convert all non-tariff barriers to bound tariffs and bind all tariffs,
" reduce all tariffs, including newly converted ones, on average by 75 per
cent over 10 years,
* the final tariff ceiling would not exceed 50 per cent,
" for products now subject to non-tariff barriers establish minimum access
commitments and expand access by 75 per cent over 10 years using a
tariff rate quota, eliminate tariff quotas after 10 years,
* provide tariff snapback provision a safeguard using a price or a quantity
trigger for the transition period,
" allow developing countries that are net importers of a commodity, de-
pending on their per capita GNP, up to 15 years to implement the
commitments.
Internal Support
" support policies directly linked to the production or price of a specific
commodity would be reduced by 75 per cent over 10 years,
" other trade-distorting measures to be reduced by 30 per cent in devel-
oped countries and according to agreed criteria for developing countries,
" reduction commitments to be implemented using an AMS,
* policies with minimal impacts on trade would be excluded from the
reductions.
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
" develop new rules to settle trade disputes,
" use the Chairman's legal text for these commitments.
Source: Summarised by W.M. Miner in "The GATT Negotiations and Canadian Agriculture" a
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